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Abstract 
 
Many international organizations channel financial contributions of their member countries through 
other international organizations to implement their programs and activities. In this context, the 
second step of the delegation chain is often costly and—at least seemingly—an easily avoidable 
duplication of a previous one. We examine the puzzling phenomenon of double delegation in the 
context of European aid. We argue that governments engage in double delegation in order to 
strengthen the role of the EU as a multilateral donor agency. This leads to an increase in the flow of 
resources that, at times, exceeds what the Commission can effectively handle alone. Delegating aid to 
other organizations helps the Commission solve this capacity problem, but it also reduces its control 
over how the resources are spent. Consequently, the Commission must exercise judgment about which 
projects it delegates to other international organizations. Our quantitative and qualitative evidence 
shows that double delegation is more likely where the Commission’s capacity as an aid donor is low 
and where EU members have no strategic interests at stake. We also show that the Commission tries 
to mitigate the loss of control by earmarking the delegated aid projects more tightly, notably when 
member preferences are heterogeneous. The results provide a new way of thinking about international 
delegation and bureaucratic politics in international organizations. Delegation problems may occur 
even if the interests between the principal and the agent align. Our approach highlights why this 
happens, and how actors try to minimize the costs of this understudied type of agency slippage.  
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anonymous reviewers, the ISQ editorial team, and the participants of the CIS Brownbag Methods Seminar in 
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provided funding for our research on the politics of multi-bi aid. In addition, we thank our interview partners at 
the European Commission and the World Bank, as well as donor government representatives from France and 
Germany for their time and their effort to help us understand this complex phenomenon. 
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International organizations often channel the contributions of their member countries through 
other multilaterals to implement their programs and activities. This phenomenon can be observed 
for a number of United Nations (UN) organizations that delegate their funds to their sister 
organizations within the UN system or other external organizations. Similarly, the Global 
Fund—a quasi-multilateral organization specialized on global health—delegates most of its 
funding to the World Health Organization (Sridhar and Woods 2013, 326-27). The Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) collaborates with the World Bank, the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and 15 additional agencies 
to develop and implement its projects (Global Environment Facility 2017; Bayer, Marcoux, and 
Urpelainen 2014, 414-15; Graham and Thompson 2015, 117-19). And the European Union (EU) 
delegates much of its development assistance to trust funds at various other international 
development organizations (IDOs) (Michaelowa, Reinsberg, and Schneider 2017, 515-17).  
In all these cases, member states delegate a task to an international organization that then 
further delegates this task to yet another international organization. The phenomenon of double 
delegation presents a puzzle. Members of most of the above-mentioned organizations could 
simply delegate directly to the second organization without going through the former. The 
phenomenon of double delegation differs from other forms of previously-studied complex 
delegation, such as multiple delegation along a chain of increasingly specialized agencies (as, for 
example, in Martens, Mummert, Murrell, and Seabright 2003, Ch. 5), simultaneous delegation by 
states to multilateral and to subnational agencies; that is, ‘dual delegation’ (Eberlein and 
Newman 2008; Newman 2010), or simultaneous delegation to many multilateral organizations 
(Hodson 2011; Hodson 2015; Henning 2017). Double delegation oftentimes takes place within 
such a wider system of complex delegation. Yet, it adds a seemingly redundant additional step in 
the delegation chain.
1
  
                                                          
1
 Some authors analyze the collaboration between similar multilateral organizations from the perspective of 
orchestration. This perspective is useful as long as the role of the organization initially in charge is merely one of 
initiating, convening, coordinating, and assisting the work of other multilateral organizations (Abbott, Genschel, 
Snidal, and Zangl 2015; Abbott, Green, and Keohane 2016). However, much of the above-mentioned 
collaborations between international organizations go well beyond orchestration. They are based on regular 
formal contracts where one agency entrusts another with the tasks that it cannot (or does not wish to) fulfill itself, 
while providing all financial means necessary. Furthermore, orchestration requires that several actors follow the 
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Why do states choose to make this seemingly unnecessary detour, especially because the 
additional layer of delegation does not come free of cost? In the case of EU aid, direct costs arise 
because IDOs charge significant fees for their services (Michaelowa et al. 2017, 517). Indirect 
costs occur because the longer chain of delegation lowers governments’ control over the ultimate 
allocation of resources. These costs, in turn, imply fewer resources for the actual development 
efforts. In addition, the allocation of these resources may not even fully correspond to what EU 
member states consider efficient in terms of their objectives. Finally, the members’ objective to 
increase the visibility of the EU as an important foreign policy actor may be compromised when 
the implementing agency combines all funding resources within one single trust fund, making 
the EU contribution one among many.  
Even though one cannot easily generalize the findings about double delegation in the EU, the 
EU’s importance as a donor in the developing world makes it intrinsically important to 
understand the causes of its double delegation. With an aid volume of over $16 billion in 2014—
corresponding to about 25% of the combined bilateral development assistance of its member 
states—the EU institutions have developed into the single largest multilateral donor; since 2010, 
they have surpassed even the World Bank (Schneider and Tobin 2013, 104).  
Moreover, the basic mechanism of double delegation in the EU compares well to double 
delegation in other IOs. The EU constitutes an important case and provides an ideal starting point 
for analyzing the phenomenon. Just as for many other organizations, EU members provide 
resources mostly on a voluntary basis through the European Development Fund (EDF). As the 
main implementing agency of EU aid, the European Commission (EC) can decide to further 
delegate these resources to the different IDOs, typically in form of trust funds. Overall, the 
Commission delegates about a quarter of its development finance to trust funds at IDOs 
including the World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF, and a number of regional organizations (own 
calculation based on data by Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2017). By doing so, the EC follows in the 
steps of many bilateral donors that increasingly channel their aid through these IDO trust funds 
(Graham 2015; Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Eichenauer 2015); a phenomenon dubbed “multi-bi 
aid” (OECD 2011, 18).  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
same tune. The second step of double delegation, however, usually presents itself as a one-to-one relationship and 
the need for further cooperation is insufficient to explain the phenomenon. 
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Why do EU member states delegate such a substantial part of their development assistance to 
the EU if the latter just delegates it further, often to IDOs to which individual member states also 
delegate aid resources directly, at lower cost? We explain the extent of double delegation with 
the existence of trade-offs between pressures to delegate more aid resources to the EU 
development agencies, the EU’s capacity to effectively allocate the increasing financial 
resources, and the ability of EU member states to control how hose resources get spent. The 
increasing delegating of government funds to European aid agencies boosted the importance of 
the EU as an actor in economic development. It also dealt with some of the coordination 
problems amongst European donors.  
The capacity of the EU as a foreign aid donor has not kept pace with these developments. 
Rather than limiting delegation to the EU, member states now allow the Commission to delegate 
some resources horizontally to other IDOs. With this double delegation, the EU can retain its 
standing in international development despite its own capacity constraints. At the same time, 
double delegation to other IDOs limits EU members’ control over the allocation of their foreign 
aid resources (which reduces their incentives to delegate to the EU in the first place). The 
Commission tries to solve this problem by (a) focusing double delegation on projects where its 
capacity in development finance is most severely limited, and (b) by increasing its control over 
the double-delegated aid through specific earmarking of resources where it pertains to the 
strategic interests of its member states.  
We analyze the empirical implications of our argument primarily through a quantitative 
approach, but one heavily informed by intensive interview-based qualitative research. The 
quantitative analysis uses specific coding of project-level information on development assistance 
to obtain the EU’s aid channels and the degree of earmarking from 2000 to 2012. The qualitative 
analysis takes information from interviews with about 40 respondents at all levels of the double 
delegation chain. We interviewed Commission staff, staff at the World Bank—the most 
important recipient of the EU’s double delegation efforts—and staff from selected EU member 
countries. In line with our expectations, we find that double delegation primarily occurs when 
development projects are directed toward recipient countries where the Commission lacks 
capacity. Strategic interests among EU member states prevent the Commission from delegating 
to IDOs. The Commission earmarks aid to IDOs more strictly when member states are more 
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reluctant to agree to double delegation in the first place and when member state preferences are 
heterogeneous.  
Our argument and findings matter to a broader body of work, which applies principal-agent 
theory to international organizations (Nielson and Tierney 2003; Pollack 1997; 2003; Johnson 
2013; 2014a; 2014b; Schneider and Slantchev 2013), and specifically to the literature of 
delegation within the EU (Coen and Thatcher 2008; Eberlein and Newman 2008; Newman 
2010). The traditional delegation literature relies on capacity gains as one important motive for 
delegation. Double delegation occurs when pressures to delegate mount even if the immediate 
agent does not have superior expertise. We demonstrate how the Commission navigates the 
conflicting goals of its own rapid growth as a major donor and development effectiveness, 
especially when it faces capacity constraints.  
Our findings also provide new insights to the standard theory of bureaucratic behavior, 
which is based on the three key motives—agency reputation, budget maximization, and career 
advancement (Arel-Bundock, Atkinson, and Potter 2015, 548; Golden 2000; Vaubel 2006). In 
cases of double delegation, the preferences between the principal and the agent align well 
because the international recognition and relevance of the first agent (the Commission) is an 
immediate goal of the principal (the EU member states). Yet, agency slippage may occur when 
the Commission delegates to IDOs. Precautionary steps, including earmarking, may become 
relevant. Furthermore, the heterogeneity of member state interests does not necessarily lead to 
greater freedom for the IDO agency because member states will then expect the Commission to 
use stronger earmarks.  
Finally, our analysis offers a new way of thinking about the phenomenon of multi-bi aid, 
which scholars have only examined from the perspective of bilateral donors. The focus there is 
on either electoral incentives (Eichenauer and Hug 2018), or the potential benefits from donor 
cooperation (Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Knack 2017).
2
 These arguments are not directly 
relevant for delegation by IDOs (electoral incentives matter indirectly at best and IDOs such as 
the EU already assume a coordinating function at the first stage of the delegation process). Yet, 
by further delegating its aid to trust funds at other IDOs, the EU resembles many bilateral 
donors. 
                                                          
2
 An exception is Michaelowa et al. (2017). 
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DOUBLE DELEGATION AND MULTI-BI AID IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Double delegation is an integral part of international cooperation. It occurs whenever member 
states delegate tasks to international organizations that in turn delegate parts of these tasks to 
other international organizations. Double delegation implies that the delegation in the second 
step is horizontal without an increasing specialization of tasks along the chain of delegation. EU 
member states delegate resources to the EU in order to finance the EU’s development policies 
through one of three channels (the common EU budget, the EDF, and the European Investment 
Bank). The EU then delegates some of the development and implementation of aid programs to 
another multilateral donor.  
Figure 1 illustrates the concept of double delegation. In the first stage, the EU member states 
contribute financial resources to the EU development institutions. These contributions—
particularly to the EDF—are largely voluntary; not all EU members contribute. Some 
contributions—particularly, to the Commission’s EuropeAid agency—are determined by the EU 
members’ financial contributions to the general EU budget. EU members delegate about 17% of 
their bilateral foreign aid resources to the EU development programs. With these efforts, the EU 
and its member states are now the world’s leading donor, providing over 50% of all development 
aid (OECD 2013a). Just taking into account the multilateral portion of the EU’s development 
finance, in 2017 it had been the largest multilateral donor in the world for over seven years 
(outranking both the World Bank and the United Nations). Developing countries around the 
world increasingly rely on the EU’s foreign aid resources.  
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Figure 1: Double Delegation in the European Union 
 
Note: IDOs represented in the graph are only a selection of the most relevant organizations for the 
Commission’s delegation. SADC=Southern African Development Community, FAO=Food and Agricultural 
Organization, UN=United Nations, WB=World Bank, EBRD=European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
 
The Commission serves as the main implementing agency of EU development finance. It 
decides whether to distribute its resources directly (through its own country offices) or indirectly 
(through more specialized agencies such as NGOs or local government agencies). The 
Commission also decides how much of these funds to delegate horizontally to other IDOs in 
form of trust funds. This type of delegation presents the second stage in our double-delegation 
chain. The IDOs serve as implementing agents that allocate the foreign aid resources either 
directly or indirectly through more specialized agencies in the recipient countries.  
Delegation from the EU to other IDOs has increased dramatically over the last few years. 
Until the mid-2000s, the EU’s multi-bi aid accounted for less than 2% of its entire aid budget 
(Figure 2). The growth of multi-bi aid started later than in EU member states, but increased at 
even faster rates. In 2012, the EU delegated almost 25% of its aid to other IDOs, while the EU 
member states individually channeled only 13% of bilateral development assistance through 
multilateral agencies. 
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Figure 2: The Development of Multi-bi Aid in the EU 
 
Source: Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2017); Michaelowa et al. (2017, 520). 
 
The Commission delegates to various different development organizations. Between 2002 
and 2012, the EU delegated about 50% of its multi-bi aid to UN organizations, 20% to regional 
development organizations, and the remaining 30% to multilateral development banks, notably 
the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The World Bank 
was the single most important IDO for the EU’s multi-bi aid. The EU and the World Bank have a 
long-standing partnership, governed by a Framework Agreement of 2001. Over time, the EU has 
become the second largest donor to World Bank trust funds, after the United Kingdom and ahead 
of the United States (World Bank 2013a, 8). It contributed not only to multi-donor trust funds, 
but also established large single-donor trust funds (with no other partners involved), notably the 
$78 billion EC-ACP Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Program (World Bank 2012, 10).  
The Commission could delegate the resources without imposing any constraints, but this 
hardly ever happens. For virtually all projects, the Commission prescribes at least a broader 
regional focus, and oftentimes even specifies the recipient country (geographic earmarking). The 
Commission also frequently pre-defines the sector in which the IDO must spend the money 
(sector earmarking). Earmarking allows the Commission to ensure that the projects respect the 
specific preferences of individual EU member states. Earmarking is an important component of 
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double delegation because it allows the Commission to balance some of the potential costs that 
arise for its member states with the benefits from delegating to IDOs. 
 THE POLITICS OF DOUBLE DELEGATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Our theoretical argument focuses on the preferences of three types of actors involved in the 
double- delegation chain: (1) the EU member countries that delegate aid resources to the EU, (2) 
the Commission which serves as the managing and implementing agency of the foreign aid 
resources, and (3) other IDOs to whom the Commission may delegate its aid resources (under the 
condition that the member states approve).  
For simplicity, and based on our interview evidence, we assume that IDOs are generally 
ready to accept the Commission’s multi-bi aid. Multi-bi aid expands the IDO’s budget through 
both the aid resources transferred and the additional fees for trust fund management. The 
additional funding usually compensates the IDO’s own cost incurred related to the services they 
provide. However, the IDO has its own funding priorities, which may not necessarily align with 
the priorities of the EU. The loss of control incurs indirect costs for EU member states, which 
add to the direct cost of delegation. Furthermore, double delegation reduces the EU’s visibility as 
a foreign actor (see discussion below), so that the EU members’ initial benefits from delegating 
to the Commission decline. 
If the delegation of foreign aid resources to IDOs entails additional costs, why would EU 
member states delegate their aid to the EU in the first place (rather than to the IDOs directly)? 
And why would the Commission not allocate these resources to recipient countries directly? We 
argue that EU members have experienced increasing incentives and pressures to delegate to the 
European Union instead of spending their foreign aid resources bilaterally or multilaterally. EU 
member states stand to benefit because the pooling of resources at the EU-level contributes to the 
development of a single strong European agency with high international visibility. Through their 
participation in EU development programs, EU member countries have become more important 
and powerful partners of recipient countries in international development.
3
 The position as a 
                                                          
3
 We focus our argument on gains from increasing the visibility of EU development finance in recipient countries. 
One could argue that the increasing delegation to the EU and the visibility of EU aid could also lead to greater 
support at the national level (Milner 2006).  
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“champion of the developing world” has not only brought the EU respect as a supporter of 
economic development, but also resulted in strategic advantages in other areas. For example, 
many countries (most of them highly dependent on EU aid) stood by the EU when it challenged 
the US-favored “scientific principle” that guides the World Trade Organization’s rules on food 
imports (Pollack and Shaffer 2009, 196; Schneider and Urpelainen 2013, 20). By now, most of 
the developing world has ratified the Cartagena Protocol that propagates the EU-favored 
“precautionary principle,” which de facto allows the EU to restrict the import of genetically 
modified organisms (GMO) from the US and other GMO-producing countries.  
EU member states have experienced increasing pressures to delegate foreign aid resources to 
the EU as well. The OECD performs regular reviews of the development cooperation efforts of 
its 29 members. The objective is to improve the quality and effectiveness of development 
cooperation policies and system, and to promote good development partnerships for better 
impact on poverty reduction and sustainable development in recipient countries. Over time, these 
reports have consistently highlighted the importance of coordination of European aid, following 
the goals of harmonization and donor coordination established globally in the Paris Declaration. 
In other words, the OECD has repeatedly promoted the delegation of more aid resources and 
decision-making capacity to the European Commission (OECD 2012, 20).  
Even though the Commission has welcomed these developments in general, it is a multi-
purpose agency that manages all the EU’s policies with limited administrative capacity and even 
more limited specialized knowledge in its individual areas of activity. The EU budget for its own 
administration is very small; less than 5% of the EU budget support the entire body of 
administrative staff. It should not come as a surprise that in development assistance, the 
Commission has not yet developed the same level of professional expertise and experience as 
other IDOs. Due to these deficiencies, its interventions tend to be both less efficient and less 
effective (e.g., Bodenstein, Faust and Furness 2017, 443; OECD 2012, 75-86).  
To improve the effectiveness of EU development assistance, while at the same time retaining 
the standing of the EU in international development finance, it may be optimal for the 
Commission to channel some of its development resources to more experienced IDOs. The 
drawback is the loss of control, and possibly, a reduced visibility of the EU as a large foreign 
policy actor. Several of our interviewees at the Commission particularly mentioned the latter 
concern. It seems plausible to assume, however, that the reduction in visibility is smaller than if 
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the EU members would have channeled the funds to the IDOs directly without the EU assuming 
any role at all. It further helps that the influence of large contributors like the EU in these IDOs 
remains relatively high, even within a trust fund managed by another agency.  
The more important problem related to the second step of delegation is that the Commission 
(and by extension the member states) loses some control over the allocation of resources. If the 
longer chain of delegation reduces the influence of EU member states over the allocation of 
funds, they may have limited incentives to agree to double delegation in the first place. The more 
the IDO’s allocation departs from the ideal aid preferences of the member states the greater the 
costs. EU members should be particularly concerned in areas of strategic relevance, and when 
they want the EU to assume the role as a powerful foreign policy actor. The costs should increase 
when EU members’ geopolitical or commercial interests are at stake (especially when the IDO 
allocates the aid resources for (non-strategic) economic development) and when the strategic 
interests of the IDO members conflict with the strategic interests of the EU member states.  
How does the Commission—the agent that moderates between the member countries and the 
IDOs—solve this dilemma? How does it balance the objectives of visibility and control given its 
own capacity constraints? Two considerations seem important. First, aid projects differ. Not all 
are equally demanding with respect to capacity. And not all are equally important to EU member 
states. The Commission can be selective in delegating some of its projects and retaining others 
under its own full responsibility. Second, earmarking provides a tool to retain some control even 
once when the Commission delegates to IDOs. To a certain extent, we may consider earmarking 
and retaining the project under the Commission’s own responsibility as substitutes. Any project 
characteristics that suggest less double delegation also suggest more earmarking (and vice versa), 
whereby the Commission can select both instruments in combination, or either of the two. 
Regarding the relevant project characteristics, we distinguish between three categories: 
Commission capacity in the specific area, member states’ strategic interests, and heterogeneous 
preferences among member states.  
First, not all aid projects are equally demanding. For instance, the EU has experience in 
cooperating with some regions, but less so with others. Furthermore, the Commission’s capacity 
varies between different sectors of activity and over time depending on staff availability. The 
greater the Commission’s capacity constraints, the greater its incentives to rely on other IDOs. 
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This implies more double delegation and less earmarking. Where the Commission has greater 
capacity, the opposite should be the case:
4
 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The likelihood for double delegation decreases for projects in 
recipient countries where the Commission has relatively more capacity and expertise. 
Hypothesis 1b: The likelihood for earmarking increases for projects in recipient 
countries where the Commission has relatively more capacity and expertise. 
 
Second, EU member states attach strategic relevance to some projects, either commercially 
(for example, because of strong trade relationships) or politically (for example, due to 
geopolitical interests). If such strategic interests are at stake, retaining control over the allocation 
of resources becomes more important. The Commission can achieve this goal if it either 
delegates less or earmarks more (or both): 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The likelihood of double delegation decreases for projects in recipient 
countries where EU member states have strategic interests. 
Hypothesis 2b: The likelihood of earmarking increases for projects in recipient 
countries where EU member states have strategic interests. 
 
Finally, EU member states sometimes have diverging preferences with respect to the 
allocation of aid. Some of the EU members may exhibit extreme, and therefore salient, positions.  
Given the decision-making rules, all member countries have to agree on the Commission’s 
delegation of resources to another IDO. As a consequence, the Commission must retain 
sufficient control over the allocation of its resources in order to convince the most reluctant 
member that its preferences will be ensured. This implies either reduced double delegation or 
more earmarking (or both): 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The likelihood of double delegation decreases for projects in recipient 
countries when EU members have heterogeneous preferences. 
                                                          
4
 All hypotheses comprise the ceteris paribus condition. 
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Hypothesis 3b: The likelihood of earmarking increases for projects in recipient 
countries when EU members have heterogeneous preferences. 
 
Note that the first two sets of hypotheses relate primarily to the second part of the double-
delegation chain, that is, the relationship between the Commission (influenced by member states’ 
preferences) and the IDO. The third set of hypotheses primarily addresses the first part of the 
double-delegation chain, that is, the interaction between the Commission and the member states. 
If we find empirical evidence for all of them, this will lend support to the importance of the 
complete double-delegation chain to explain the allocation of funding. Standard models of 
delegation assume that the heterogeneity of principals’ preferences provides for more discretion 
of the agency (that is, the Commission, who might put somewhat more weight on capacity than 
EU members, could benefit by delegating more aid to IDOs). Indeed, this result holds for the 
case when the Commission allocates foreign aid directly (Schneider and Tobin 2013, 109). In our 
context, however, the relevant divergence of preferences is not between the Commission and EU 
members, but between the former two and the IDO. In this case, the Commission should take up 
the salient request for control by some members, and adjust its position on further delegation and 
earmarking accordingly.  
DATA AND METHODS 
We test the implications of our theory using two complementary sources of evidence. We 
conduct regression analysis to assess the EU's patterns of double delegation and earmarking of 
multi-bi aid activities. Furthermore, we illustrate the causal mechanism with qualitative evidence 
from the multi-bi partnership between the Commission and the World Bank. Our quantitative 
data cover the Commission’s aid activities for the 2000-2012 period. We base all general aid-
related data either on the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the OECD data on aggregate flows (OECD 2013a; 
2013b). For activities delegated to IDOs, we use the multi-bi aid dataset by Eichenauer and 
Reinsberg (2017), which complements the existing OECD data on aid channeled through 
multilaterals by coding qualitative information on transition channels for additional years and by 
including information on earmarking along several dimensions. We collected additional data for 
the Commission and the World Bank from the organizations’ webpages, EU budget reports, and 
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the World Bank’s (2013c) trust fund databases. We took all general recipient country 
information from the World Bank’s (2014) World Development Indicators, Eurostat (2015), and 
Mayer and Zignago (2006). Appendix 1 provides detailed definitions of all variables, including 
data sources, and descriptive statistics.
5
 The original aid data are at the project level, but our unit 
of analysis is at the recipient country-year level, which allows us to directly assess the impact of 
different recipient country characteristics on the Commission’s delegation patterns.
6
  
Our qualitative analysis draws on evidence from both interviews and official documents. 
Overall, we conducted more than 40 interviews with Commission officials, World Bank staff, 
and individual bilateral donors. Our interviews at the Commission covered different respondents 
at the Directorates-General for International Co-operation and Development 
(DEVCO/EuropeAid) as well as the European External Action Service (EEAS). Our interviews 
at the World Bank purposively sampled on individuals with experience in the Commission and 
individuals from different sectoral departments (see Appendix 3 for a list of interviews). The 
most relevant official document is the “Financial Regulation,” which governs the relationship 
between the Commission and the IDOs. Based on this regulation, which was last updated by the 
member states and the European Parliament in March 2013, the Commission concludes 
framework agreements with the IDOs. These framework agreements require the IDOs to have 
minimum standards of accounting, internal control, auditing, and procurement. The Financial 
Regulation obliges the Commission to maintain some prerogatives of control and verification 
(European Commission 2014). The Trust Fund and Co-Financing Framework Agreement—
concluded in the early 2000s and periodically updated—formalizes the specific partnership 
between the Commission and the World Bank. It applies to all Commission entities and to all 
trust funds of the Commission with the World Bank (see European Commission 2013; World 
Bank 2013b).  
Variables 
                                                          
5
 All appendices are available online and from the authors. 
6
 We follow Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2017) and exclude all aid flows dedicated to debt relief and humanitarian 
aid. These are distinct from aid activities for substantive development purposes. We also drop all aid activities 
that cannot be attributabed to individual recipient countries. 
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In a first step, we analyze the determinants of double delegation. We measure the dependent 
variable of the double-delegation regressions as the percentage of EU aid to a recipient that the 
Commission channels through an IDO each year. In a second step, we analyze the extent to 
which the EU’s multi-bi aid is earmarked. The dependent variable of the earmarking regressions 
is the percentage of all double delegated EU aid that the Commission earmarks either 
geographically to specific countries or sectorally. We consider both dimensions separately. 
While our theory does not suggest any specific differences, it is evident that with a mean of 94%, 
geographic earmarking is much more frequent than sector earmarking (mean of 20%).  
The operationalization of our explanatory variables is less straightforward. Many indicators 
reflect EC capacity, EU member states’ strategic interest, and preference heterogeneity. None of 
them cover these concepts in a comprehensive way. To make matters worse, several variables 
relate to both capacity and strategic interest. In some cases, data constraints limit our choice to 
imprecise measures of the concepts at hand. We resort to a choice of variables that combines 
different measures for each of the concepts, informed by the general aid allocation literature (see, 
among many others, Bermeo and Leblang 2015; Berthélemy and Tichit 2004; Chauvet 2003; 
Hoeffler and Outram 2011). In addition, we make sure that at least some variables are not 
observationally equivalent for each concept we aim to measure, so that it is possible to 
discriminate between effects related to capacity and strategic interest.  
To test the first set of hypotheses, we use measures related to capacity. The Commission 
should have more capacity in areas in which the EU has a long-standing presence. This includes 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP)—with whom the Commission has 
been collaborating since the very beginning of its development program in 1957—and to a lesser 
extent, the countries included in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) developed in 2004. 
Common language with the partner country further facilitates project implementation for the 
Commission, as its staff will be able to understand the project documentation and to 
communicate with local stakeholders more easily. We code indicator variables for projects in the 
ACP and ENP regions (ACP country, ENP country), and for recipients for which one of the 
national languages corresponds to the language of at least one EU member country (Common 
language).  
While we see these variables primarily as indicators of greater capacity, they may also signal 
strategic interests. In both cases, we would expect less double delegation and more earmarking. 
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The prediction is hence unambiguous, and a failure to find corresponding evidence would put in 
question both the first and the second set of hypotheses.  
To directly address only the capacity-related hypotheses, we further consider a count of 
Commission staff (log). The available data varies only across time. EuropeAid can more easily 
handle projects that are launched in years when the Commission has more staff (at given aid 
volumes) because more people are available to manage and monitor these projects, both in the 
headquarters and on the ground. Since we only consider aggregate numbers, changes reflect the 
member states’ overall support for the EU’s aid activities, but not new areas of strategic priority.  
Second, capacity could be conceived as a relative concept, that is, by comparing the 
Commission’s capacity to the capacity of the IDOs to which it could delegate. Many donors 
expect substantial gains driven by economies of scale in large organizations like the World Bank 
and by the expertise of their staff (Milner and Tingley 2013, 317-18). Projects in countries in 
which other IDOs are very well represented and experienced may lead the Commission to think 
twice about whether to rely on its own limited capacity or to reap the benefits from further 
delegation. To capture this relative perspective, we include information on the major IDO that 
may represent an alternative: the World Bank. We do not have specific information on the 
number of local staff, but we know whether the World Bank has an office in the respective 
country (WB delegation), and we know the World Bank’s volume of aid. We use World Bank aid 
volume as percentage of Commission aid (WB amount) to capture the relative capacity advantage 
of the local World Bank office.  
Third, we introduce an indicator for areas that have only recently become relevant within the 
aid community for reasons beyond the EU’s control. In these cases, the EU lacks capacity to 
address the emergent interest in this aid sector. We infer the importance of specific sectors from 
the creation of new Development Assistant Committee (DAC) working groups—informal 
discussion groups among the OECD/DAC donors that set the agenda on new development issues 
such as poverty alleviation, fragile states, and the environment (Reinsberg et al. 2017). Important 
sector is a dummy variable that captures whether a country has obtained aid projects in any of 
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the new DAC working group priority sectors in each year. In these areas, the EU lacks capacity, 
and we expect that this should lead to more double delegation and less earmarking.
7
  
To test the second set of hypotheses, we include variables related to strategic interests and 
purely developmental motivation of aid. To capture economic interest, we use the export share of 
the three most influential EU members–Germany, France and United Kingdom–in percent of 
their exports to developing countries (Export share in EU-3). To measure developmental needs, 
we include three variables related to poverty and vulnerability: Life expectancy (log), GDP per 
capita (log), and an indicator variable for fragile states (Fragile state).  
Some of these variables may be ambivalent. When countries are prioritized by the EU for 
either strategic reasons or for reasons of developmental needs, this may induce the Commission 
to build more capacity in these countries. For the export-related variable, predictions are indeed 
indistinguishable as both greater capacity and strategic interests should decrease double 
delegation and increase earmarking. For the need-related variables, however, the two 
interpretations lead to opposing predictions: while greater development needs suggest more 
double delegation and less earmarking, higher capacity that the Commission may have built in 
the context of such countries suggests less double delegation and more earmarking. If our 
suggested interpretation in terms of the strategic interest (versus needs) hypotheses dominates, 
fragile states and countries with low life expectancy or GDP per capita should be associated with 
more double delegation and less earmarking.  
To test the third set of hypotheses, we include measures of interest heterogeneity in the EU. 
Matching our decision to separately examine geographical and sectoral earmarking, we define 
EU member heterogeneity along the same two dimensions. Assuming that members’ own 
bilateral aid allocation corresponds to their individual preferences over multilateral aid allocation 
(Schneider and Tobin 2013, 105; 2016, 648), we use the different shares of bilateral aid they 
allocate to any given recipient each year to compute a coefficient of variation that captures 
geographical heterogeneity (Geographic heterogeneity). For the heterogeneity of sectoral 
                                                          
7
 Capacity cannot be confounded with strategic interest because the EU member states do not attach specific 
relevance to the topics covered by DAC working groups, even if strategically relevant for the donor community 
as a whole. Even if they were, expectations for the effect on double delegation and earmarking would be opposed 
to the prediction we get for the interpretation in terms of a lack of capacity.  
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preferences (Sector heterogeneity), we further distinguish between sector shares within each 
recipient (see Appendix 2 for a formal exposition). Both measures include merely the EU-15 
subset of members because new members became official aid donors only recently, and they 
have contributed relatively little bilateral aid (so that their inclusion may be misleading).  
We further include Commission aid growth, measured as the annual percentage growth in 
foreign aid provided by the Commission (to put the Commission staff numbers into perspective), 
a dummy for the period after the Paris Declaration in 2005 that arguably gave a push to multi-bi 
aid (Post-Paris Declaration), and a linear time trend. We use all variables in both equations, with 
the exception of the Post-Paris Declaration dummy, which is relevant only for the decision on 
double delegation (Barakat, Rzeszut, and Martin 2012; Reinsberg et al. 2015).  
Model Specification 
The equations estimating the effect on double delegation and the equations estimating the effect 
on earmarking are not independent from each other. The decision to increase earmarking can 
substitute for a decision to reduce double delegation. In addition, when there is no double 
delegation, the Commission cannot earmark. A standard Heckman selection model is not 
appropriate because we measure double delegation as the percentage of EU’s multi-bi aid given 
to a specific recipient in each year. Reducing this variable to a binary choice variable would lead 
to a loss of information and to an arbitrary decision about the cut-off. We resort to a more 
flexible version of a Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) model that allows us to jointly estimate 
the two regressions in an extended Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) framework 
(Roodman 2009). In addition, we cluster standard errors at the recipient level. 
The use of recipient fixed effects would in principle be compatible with this framework but 
leads to some difficulties in our context. Many of our variables of interest are time-invariant 
country characteristics. These would drop out in a fixed-effects estimation. To preempt concerns 
about the potential bias due to omitted time-invariant variables, we tested for the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity using the Mundlak approach. We added the cross-section means of all 
variables to our model and conducted an F-test on their joint significance. This approach works 
as a diagnostic device for unobserved heterogeneity because a linear combination of these 
variable means approximates the fixed effects (Mundlak 1978). The F-test was not significant in 
either of the two models, so fixed effects do not seem necessary in our analysis.  
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Tables 1 and 2 present the results of the CMP estimation. Table 1 focuses on the double 
delegation model, Table 2 on the earmarking model. In both tables, the first three columns refer 
to geographic earmarking and member heterogeneity while the remaining three refer to sector 
earmarking and heterogeneity. Within each set of regressions, the second and third columns 
provide more refined specifications of the capacity-related variables (see below).  
Capacity 
Supporting Hypothesis 1a, double delegation is significantly less frequent in regions where the 
Commission exhibits greater capacity. Projects in ACP countries are about 0.8-1.2 percentage 
points less likely to be funded through other IDOs. This effect is non-negligible. For much of the 
period under consideration the share of projects with double delegation remained below 5%. 
Common language shows an even greater effect in reducing the probability of double delegation 
(by up to 1.9 percentage points). The coefficients for ENP countries generally point in the right 
direction but never become significant—probably because the Commission has started to build 
capacity in this region only relatively recently.  
What about the effect of capacity on earmarking (Hypothesis 1b)? Even though we find the 
expected positive effect for common language, the two other variables are largely insignificant. 
It appears that the effect of capacity works predominantly through a reduction of double 
delegation, rather than an increase in earmarking. For geographic earmarking, we observe a 
strong positive effect of capacity. It seems that the Commission spends more efforts in selecting 
the recipients  when it has a larger staff, leaving less room to maneuver for the IDOs. Wherever 
significant, the effect on double delegation points in the direction suggested by our hypothesis, 
but it appears much less robust. The variables for a local Word Bank delegation and the amount 
it oversees (introduced to capture the Commission’s relative capacity) are insignificant or (in one 
case) contradictory. Of course, the Bank is present in almost all recipient countries and there is 
little variation on this variable, which may explain the insignificant finding. In addition, the 
variation in aid volumes may not reflect the variation in the capacity of the country offices very 
well. Unfortunately, we could not obtain more concise information on local Commission and 
IDO capacity. 
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Table 1: Double delegation model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ACP country -0.833* -0.908** -0.838* -1.052** -1.249** -1.074** 
 (0.495) (0.449) (0.497) (0.510) (0.540) (0.510) 
ENP country -0.957 -0.770 -0.963 -0.953 -0.750 -0.961 
 (0.755) (0.801) (0.752) (0.749) (0.791) (0.746) 
Common language -1.851** -1.641** -1.853** -1.737** -1.518** -1.729** 
 (0.748) (0.675) (0.749) (0.715) (0.640) (0.716) 
Commission staff (log) -1.930 -6.615* 0.794 -2.170 -6.676* 0.763 
 (3.301) (3.539) (3.604) (3.392) (3.446) (3.631) 
WB delegation -1.327 0.232 -1.349 -1.401 0.461 -1.431 
 (1.278) (0.424) (1.307) (1.403) (0.437) (1.439) 
WB amount  0.179   0.183  
  (0.202)   (0.200)  
Important sector   0.851***   0.877*** 
   (0.254)   (0.252) 
Export share in EU-3 -0.139* -0.142** -0.139* -0.117* -0.112* -0.114 
 (0.075) (0.071) (0.075) (0.070) (0.063) (0.070) 
Life expectancy (log) -2.754** -3.795*** -2.714** -3.011** -4.344*** -2.983** 
 (1.320) (1.387) (1.317) (1.294) (1.632) (1.292) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.127 0.222 0.132 0.048 0.123 0.048 
 (0.256) (0.336) (0.257) (0.235) (0.294) (0.236) 
Fragile state 0.243 0.560 0.247 0.206 0.542 0.208 
 (0.577) (0.610) (0.578) (0.580) (0.610) (0.582) 
Geographic heterogeneity -0.064 -0.304 -0.047    
 (0.364) (0.514) (0.365)    
Sector heterogeneity    0.304 0.292 0.343 
    (0.330) (0.369) (0.332) 
Commission aid growth 0.267 -0.456 0.233 0.270 -0.523 0.249 
 (1.426) (1.103) (1.433) (1.437) (1.123) (1.443) 
Linear trend 0.356*** 0.332*** 0.376*** 0.368*** 0.351*** 0.389*** 
 (0.100) (0.079) (0.101) (0.095) (0.073) (0.096) 
Post-Paris Declaration 1.310** 2.001*** 1.025* 1.391*** 2.072*** 1.076* 
 (0.524) (0.727) (0.553) (0.531) (0.757) (0.562) 
Observations 1542 1138 1542 1533 1136 1533 
Recipient countries 125 121 125 125 121 125 
R
2
 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.14 
Double delegation equation of SUR system. Recipient-clustered standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 2: Earmarking model 
 Geographic earmarking Sector earmarking 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ACP country -4.385** -2.735 -2.586 -6.482 -6.799 -7.067 
 (2.062) (2.396) (2.392) (5.325) (5.616) (5.611) 
ENP country -0.520 -1.239 -1.342 2.137 1.862 2.089 
 (2.151) (1.288) (1.298) (3.737) (4.314) (4.276) 
Common language 3.190** 1.275 1.253 10.653*** 9.177** 9.235** 
 (1.464) (1.216) (1.223) (4.125) (4.300) (4.258) 
Commission staff (log) 74.559*** 59.736*** 57.908*** -9.502 -21.437 -16.530 
 (15.351) (15.276) (14.952) (37.138) (39.062) (41.117) 
WB delegation -4.614*   12.325**   
 (2.629)   (5.019)   
WB amount  -0.035 -0.052  -0.707 -0.693 
  (0.259) (0.256)  (0.992) (0.971) 
Important sector   1.983*   -3.964 
   (1.166)   (3.870) 
Export share in EU-3 0.397*** 0.254* 0.263* 0.322 0.294 0.278 
 (0.144) (0.148) (0.147) (0.277) (0.300) (0.300) 
Life expectancy (log) 15.670 9.443 9.746 27.578* 16.864 16.294 
 (10.524) (11.014) (11.075) (15.099) (16.960) (16.995) 
GDP per capita (log) -2.329** -0.378 -0.359 -5.421*** -3.192* -3.233* 
 (0.935) (0.905) (0.902) (1.618) (1.716) (1.696) 
Fragile state 2.203* 0.698 0.653 -1.687 0.358 0.420 
 (1.262) (1.243) (1.244) (3.268) (3.451) (3.441) 
Geographic heterogeneity 3.967*** 3.269** 3.223**    
 (1.209) (1.511) (1.508)    
Sector heterogeneity    9.130** 5.731* 5.739* 
    (3.677) (3.387) (3.363) 
Commission aid growth 16.963*** 14.460*** 13.513*** 46.964*** 43.580** 45.628*
* 
 (4.874) (3.848) (3.712) (16.401) (18.035) (18.447) 
Linear trend -1.200*** -0.991*** -0.888*** -1.476** -1.315** -
1.522** 
 (0.271) (0.245) (0.250) (0.583) (0.636) (0.686) 
Observations 655 538 538 655 538 538 
Recipient countries 125 121 125 125 121 125 
R
2
 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07 
Earmarking equation of SUR system. Recipient-clustered standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
22 
 
We now turn to the indicator for aid sectors that have recently become important within the 
DAC. We expect the Commission to lack capacity in these sectors, which—according to 
Hypothesis 1a—should lead to increased double delegation. Our results indicate a highly 
significant positive effect on double delegation, the size of which corresponds to the effect of 
ACP country (Table 1, columns 3 and 6). The EC could additionally (or alternatively) react by 
reducing sector earmarking (Hypothesis 1b). Yet, the effect on sector earmarking is not 
significant at conventional levels. In line with our previous results, capacity predominantly 
affects double delegation, but not earmarking.  
Our quantitative results support the first set of hypotheses: the likelihood of double 
delegation decreases when the Commission’s capacity and expertise increase. While some of the 
variables are imprecise, most show the expected relationship with respect to double delegation 
and earmarking. This is also true for the variables Commission staff and Important sector. We 
find more support for Hypothesis 1a than for Hypothesis 1b. However, based on the quantitative 
analysis alone, this result should be interpreted with caution given that the earmarking 
regressions are based on a much smaller number of observations. 
Our qualitative results further support the outcome of our quantitative analysis. Many 
interviewees at all three levels of the double-delegation chain (member countries, Commission, 
and IDO) mentioned capacity constraints as one of the key reasons for the Commission to 
delegate aid further. In our interviews, World Bank officials stated that the EU valued the Bank 
for its “broad network of contacts on the ground needed for rapid implementation.” This and 
other related statements imply that the EU delegates its foreign aid resources to IDOs mainly to 
take advantage of their expertise and related efficiency gains. The Commission’s rapid increases 
in foreign aid resources that have gone unmatched with proportional increases in capacity led to 
serious capacity constraints. While our respondents at the Commission focus on staff numbers 
when they speak about capacity, other sources see the capacity deficits primarily in the 
Commission’s lack of expertise. One Commission official stated that the Commission gained 
additional benefits due to the comfort of delegating aid further and “’getting things done’ without 
a lot of own human resources.” According to a regional expert at the World Bank, the 
Commission lacks capacities for processing foreign aid even in its own neighborhood. This could 
provide an additional explanation why even the ENP variable does not become significant in our 
statistical analysis; only with ACP countries, significantly more experience seems to have 
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accumulated over time. When capacity is lacking, according to the same regional expert, the 
Bank “is an efficient partner to accelerate aid absorption on the ground, given its in-house 
knowledge and its dense network of contractors.” The Commission sometimes “asks the World 
Bank for specific inputs that the EC itself would not be able to deliver in a timely manner.” For 
example, the Commission asked the World Bank for a feasibility study on an energy market 
project in the Caspian region.  
Our qualitative research further suggests that the failure to find clear results for earmarking 
may not simply be an artifact of smaller sample size. Respondents in our interviews do not 
mention earmarking as overly resource intensive for the Commission. While World Bank 
officials report that working with the EU in the context of trust fund arrangements is at times 
extremely work-intensive, this relates primarily to legal provisions and oversight clauses the 
Commission regularly requests. Our interviews suggest that the Commission staff are less 
concerned about this, possibly because of their high legal and administrative capacity (as 
opposed to their developmental expertise and capacity) (OECD 2012). Hence, our qualitative 
results also reflect the limited support for the link between capacity and earmarking: it appears 
that the effect of capacity primarily works via the decision on double delegation. In sum, the role 
of capacity with respect to earmarking (Hypothesis 1b) is more difficult to establish than the role 
of capacity for double delegation (Hypothesis 1a), where the evidence is much clearer.  
Strategic Interest  
We also find some evidence for the role of strategic interest through trade and poverty related 
variables (Hypotheses 2a and b). As expected, recipients that import from the EU tend to receive 
funding directly from the Commission rather than via other IDOs. If aid is double-delegated, the 
likelihood for geographical earmarks increases significantly. More specifically, if a recipient 
receives 10 percentage points more of its imports from the three major EU members, the former 
has a 1.1-1.4 percentage points higher chance to receive aid funding directly from the EC 
(Table 1). The likelihood of geographical earmarking to this specific recipient country increases 
by 2.5-4 percentage points if the Commission decides to delegate to another IDO (Table 2).  
Among the three variables that measure developmental needs, life expectancy appears most 
important. When life expectancy doubles, the likelihood of double delegation decreases by 
roughly 3-4 percentage points. The effect on earmarking is even greater, albeit significant in only 
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one regression (Table 2, column 4). These results point to a dominance of strategic interests (or 
the lack thereof). If the Commission focused its capacity on countries with low life expectancy, 
then increasing life expectancy should lead to more—rather than less—double delegation and to 
reduced earmarking. This is not what we observe. There are no significant results in the double-
delegation models, but some significant coefficients for earmarking. They suggest that the 
Commission earmarks more when projects benefit poorer countries. We checked whether the 
direct correlation between life expectancy and GDP per capita explains these findings by running 
the models with only one of the two variables. This did not change our results. The additional 
indicator variable for fragile states almost never turns significant.  
Overall, our quantitative analysis provides support for strategic interests with respect to the 
recipients’ share of EU-3 exports and life expectancy in recipient countries. Our qualitative 
analysis provides additional evidence. In the words of a Bank official, “the [Commission] has its 
thematic priorities,” which “respond to salient member state interests.” Another World Bank 
staff member said that given that the Commission now manages a significant multilateral budget, 
“it is unavoidable that those pressures [from influential donor countries] are scaled up at the 
European level.” Commission officials shared this view. One official stated: “[…] large member 
states influence implementation on important issues” and thereby “reinforce their own bilateral 
agenda at the EU level.” It seems to happen rather frequently that the EU requires tighter control 
than all other donors contributing to World Bank trust funds. To accommodate these special 
requirements of the EU, the World Bank specifically introduced the instrument of “notional 
agreements,” which implicitly allows earmarking related to sub-sectors, otherwise prohibited by 
World Bank rules (World Bank 2013b, 6). In sum, the above results provide support for 
Hypotheses 2a and b. 
Heterogeneous preferences 
When EU member preferences are heterogeneous, the Commission must ensure the most 
skeptical member that its interests will not be violated through a loss of control induced by 
double delegation. Theoretically, we expect less double delegation (Hypothesis 3a), or more 
earmarking (Hypothesis 3b), or both. Empirically, we find no evidence for an effect of 
heterogeneous preferences on further delegation (Table 1, columns 1-6). However, we find a 
highly significant positive effect on earmarking (Table 2).  
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The results suggest that reluctant member countries accept double delegation if earmarking 
ensures that their specific interests are taken into account. Our qualitative research supports this 
view. One Commission official said: “the [Commission] will anticipate potential problems in the 
relevant committee and not propose projects that do not find common support.” This implies that 
the Commission must propose an allocation that respects all member states’ salient interests, so 
that greater heterogeneity of interests would predict a higher level of earmarking. The 
preferences of individual member states prevent double delegation altogether only if the IDO 
does not allow for earmarking. For example, a Bank official mentioned that in the Sustainable 
Energy Partnership, the Commission could not contribute to hydropower plants because there 
were reservations against this type of energy from some of the EU member countries that 
prevented the Commission from supporting the program. Even in these cases, the Commission 
usually finds a way to circumvent the problem, for example, by generating a parallel single 
donor trust fund with more narrowly defined objectives for the Commission alone. In sum, 
heterogeneous preferences matter, but the effect works through increased earmarking 
(Hypothesis 3b) rather than through reduced double delegation. 
Robustness tests 
To analyze whether our findings depend on the joint estimation of the double delegation and the 
earmarking model within the CMP framework, we present separate estimations of these models 
using random-effects estimations in Appendices 4 and 5. The results are robust and support the 
role of Commission capacity on the one hand, and strategic considerations on the other. As in our 
main estimations, heterogeneous EU member preferences do not affect double delegation, but 
earmarking. 
We further explore the effect of member heterogeneity by including interaction terms with 
other variables to our main specification: regional dummies for ACP and ENP countries, 
common language, and the EU-3 export share (Appendices 6 and 7). We examine both the CMP 
estimations (columns 1 and 3) and the separate random effects estimations (columns 2 and 4). 
The corresponding interaction terms hardly ever turn out to be significant. We conclude that 
there is no systematic influence of member heterogeneity. 
Finally, we use an alternative measure for when countries become unexpectedly important, 
so that the Commission suffers from at least a temporary lack of capacity. Rather than inferring 
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importance from high-priority aid sectors, we consider that countries may suddenly require more 
support when they are hit by war. The increased humanitarian needs following the onset of war 
often call upon donors to increase their aid. We identify seven cases for which the Commission 
may have been obliged to increase its aid for this reason, while lacking capacities on its own to 
deliver the increased aid efficiently. These cases include Serbia (1997), Afghanistan (2001), 
Pakistan (2002), Iraq (2003), Somalia (2006), Yemen (2009), and Syria (2011). We only take the 
first year of each of these conflicts, assuming the Commission could in principle remedy its 
capacity deficits as time elapses. We find that country importance does not significantly affect 
the Commission’s double-delegation behavior, but sector earmarking is significantly lower in 
such cases (Appendix 8).  
To summarize, the results suggest that a trade-off between efficiency gains of delegation, 
notably when the Commission’s capacity is low and the interest to control aid allocations is 
great, explains double delegation. Even if agency slippage does not occur between the 
Commission and the EU member countries as its principals, further delegation to the IDO may 
lead to agency slippage by this secondary agency. This is why the Commission tends to renounce 
on double delegation in areas in which it possesses higher capacity and where member states’ 
strategic interests are at stake. To maintain control, the Commission can also increase 
earmarking, but we find slightly less evidence for this alternative strategy. In contrast, when the 
Commission reacts to heterogeneous member preferences, its preferred strategy includes an 
increase in earmarking. Individual members with particularly salient preferences seem to support 
double delegation as long as the tighter earmarking protects their interests. We thus obtain some 
supportive evidence for all three sets of hypotheses derived from our theoretical framework, in 
particular for Hypothesis 1a, 2a and 3b.  
CONCLUSION 
International organizations oftentimes delegate tasks bestowed upon them by their member states 
to other international organizations, without any obvious gain in the specialization of expertise. 
Given that the second step of the delegation chain does not come free of cost, this article 
questioned why they pursue these strategies, and why member states do not directly delegate 
these resources to the second organization.  
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Our analysis focuses on the double delegation of development assistance in the European 
Union. We argue that EU member states have experienced increased pressures and incentives to 
delegate foreign aid resources through the European institutions. The increased delegation of 
foreign aid may overburden even a large institution. Indeed, the Commission’s capacity to 
handle development finance lags behind the pace of increasing delegation to the EU. Double 
delegation presents one strategy for the EU to maintain its role as a major foreign aid actor in 
international development, while at the same time ensuring efficient aid provision by delegating 
its resources to other IDOs. The EU can control the latter through different levels of earmarking 
when necessary. Our qualitative and quantitative analyses provide support for this argument. We 
find that capacity constraints play an important role in the decision to double delegate. We also 
find that EU members’ strategic interest place constraints on this delegation to other IDOs. When 
such interests are strong, double delegation does not take place at all or the EU maintains control 
through tighter earmarking. When EU member preferences are heterogeneous, the level of 
control depends on the most skeptical member state. This is reflected in an even tighter 
earmarking.  
These results differ from what one would expect in a standard principle-agent context. If we 
considered EU members and the Commission, we would easily misinterpret aid allocations that 
do not follow the members’ preferences as agency slippage by the Commission. This would 
imply a reduction or tighter control of funding to the EU. This is not what we observe. The agent 
responsible for potential agency slippage is the IDO rather than the Commission, whose interests 
are well aligned with those of the member states in the context examined here. Similarly, a 
standard principal-agent model would suggest that heterogeneity in member preferences, that is, 
divergence of interest among the multiple principals of the Commission, should provide more 
discretion to the latter that it could use for its own benefit (for example, by delegating more aid 
to other IDOs). This is not what we observe here. There is no substantial difference in the 
preferences of the Commission and the member states in the first place. Both parties want strong 
and powerful EU institutions, and both parties want to maximize aid effectiveness under these 
conditions. To understand the empirical evidence, we must take into account the full double-
delegation chain. 
The empirical findings shed some light on the puzzle of why the EU, which is a major 
international development organization itself, delegates to other IDOs. They indicate that 
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although the EU—as a multilateral donor—outspends even the World Bank, it still depends on 
other more established development organizations as vehicles to maximize the effectiveness of 
its aid. The benefits from double delegation are strongest for foreign-aid resources that support 
projects in some of the poorest regions of the world. Most double-delegated EU aid flows into 
these countries. 
These findings complement the extant literature on delegation and principal-agent problems 
in international organizations by introducing a second (horizontal) step of delegation, without 
any gains in specialization.
8
 It accounts for the important and pro-active role of the international 
bureaucracies (Johnson 2013; 2014a; 2014b), but relaxes assumptions that grant agent expertise 
a central role in explaining delegation (Schneider and Slantchev 2013). And it contributes to the 
discussion of new funding mechanisms for international organizations (Goetz and Patz 2017; 
Graham 2015), and the emerging literature focusing on multi-bi aid (Reinsberg et al. 2015; 
2017), with a focus on trust funds in IDOs by IDOs.  
Even though it is beyond the scope of this article to offer a test of double delegation in other 
areas, our findings provide insights about the conditions under which we would expect to see 
double delegation. First, incentives for double delegation arise when pressures and opportunities 
to delegate are independent of the expertise of the international organization. If such pressures 
exist (for example, when there is the need to coordinate actions in a single entity to increase 
effectiveness and visibility), double delegation may occur because the organizational agent may 
not be able to implement the tasks efficiently. Second, double delegation assumes that there 
exists a second layer of international organizations that can accommodate the resources (or other 
tasks) in the second stage of delegation—as well as implement them more efficiently. Finally, 
the international organization in the first stage needs some ability to control the actions of the 
international organization at the second stage. In our case, the EC was able to control the IDOs’ 
behavior using different levels of earmarking. If such control is not possible, we expect less 
double delegation, especially when member state interests are strategic, heterogeneous, or not in 
line with the international organization at the second stage.  
                                                          
8
 Our argument about the importance of complex delegation patterns in international relations follows similar 
arguments made about orchestration (Abbott et al. 2015; 2016), new interdependence (Farrell and Newman 
2014), and complex governance (Kahler 2016).  
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While not all of these conditions hold for every case of double delegation, they can help 
scholars develop more specific hypotheses about the relationships between capacity, interests, 
heterogeneity, and double delegation. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) may prove an 
interesting case for further research. The GEF is the only tangible outcome of the Rio Earth 
Summit in 1992, and the only established and well-functioning international organization 
responsible for climate finance. Its international standing and the size of its activities matter a lot 
to member countries. While there is a more direct interaction between recipient countries and 
GEF agencies than in the case of EU aid, the projects elaborated and implemented by GEF 
agencies—like the World Bank or the UNDP—could, in principle, also be funded by member 
states directly. This suggests a similar puzzle to the one posed in our article. The phenomenon of 
double delegation is particularly interesting because the second step of the delegation chain is 
parallel—that is, between rather similar organizations. This suggests that there may also be cases 
where two organizations mutually entrust each other with some of their projects.  
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION  
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